Seven key themes for 2022 and beyond

Alongside the terrible human tragedy that has unfolded since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the war has also exaggerated many pre-existing trends. Some include the upward pressure on commodities and further disruptions to global supply chains at a time when inflationary forces have already been elevated.

The market has not widely observed stagflation (slowing economic growth at a time of accelerating prices) since the 1970s. 

At a high level it is not associated with rising equity markets due to the resulting squeeze on profit margins. Historically speaking, it also has not been a favorable environment for bonds; commodities and safe havens such as gold are regarded as the key beneficiaries.

This poses a big conundrum to central banks that do not want to choke off the post COVID-19 recovery, but also need to prevent inflation from affecting an escalating wage-price spiral. 

Interest rates are ultimately a blunt weapon. However, it is now widely believed that the US Federal Reserve is behind the curve and is doing its utmost to get back in the game. Current market expectations suggest a Fed Funds Rate north of 3% (currently 0.25%-0.5%) by early next year alongside a more aggressive tilt to quantitative tightening, which will equate to a further 0.25% rate hike.

The recent inversion of the US yield curve (10-year/2-year) is another ominous portent as it has a good track record of predicting future recessions, although the lags can be long (the median lead time from the last six inversions is 18 months).

Figure 1 - US Yield – 10 Year minus 2 Year (%)

Source: Schroders, Datastream. Data to April 1, 2022. 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Minus 2-Year Treasury Constant Maturity. Shaded areas indicate US recessions as determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Historical market trends should not be relied upon to predict future results.

Source: Schroders, Datastream. Data to April 1, 2022. 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Minus 2-Year Treasury Constant Maturity. Shaded areas indicate US recessions as determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Historical market trends should not be relied upon to predict future results.

In terms of the market’s reaction to both the war and the Fed’s policy pivot, commodities have already ratcheted higher and bonds have sold off sharply while equities seem to be in a state of denial. Against this uncertain backdrop, here are the seven key themes our QEP Investment team is watching for in the months (and in some cases years) to come:

#1 - Recession or not, global growth is compromised

This has significant investment implications for all asset classes but the divergence in volatility between bonds and equities this year suggests a huge disconnect in thinking. 

The implicit assumption of equity investors appears to be that unemployment remains low and both household and corporate balance sheets are robust. 

In other words, the Fed will do a good job of taming inflation without engineering a recession.

However, history has shown that this picture can change quickly as growth dissipates. Moreover, wage gains are being eroded by inflation and consumers will need to use savings to provide any prospect of a soft landing. In the meantime, forecasts for corporate earnings this year continue to be revised upward, which suggests a reasonable degree of complacency.

Wall Street is not Main Street, but it seems very unlikely that the positive momentum behind equities that investors have enjoyed since 2009 will persist with the same vigor, particularly given the starting valuations of many of the index heavyweights. 

However, many areas, including a long tail of stocks outside of the mainstream benchmarks, are far more attractively valued and the bar to outperform is balanced in their favor. We expect there to be a wide dispersion between the relative winners and losers across the universe given the many forces at play.

#2 - The Ukraine conflict will not be another forgotten war

The implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are significant, given its strategic location on the border of NATO countries and its importance as a supplier of raw materials. 

A wide range of outcomes is possible but a stalemate associated with a long-running simmering conflict has the potential to result in large swings in geopolitical risk sentiment for many years, regardless of whether it ultimately leads to a regime change in Moscow.

The direct linkages between Russia and the global economy are actually relatively small. Russia accounts for around 3% of Eurozone exports and we estimate that less than 0.5% of earnings from companies in the MSCI World Index is attributed directly to Russia. 

It is the broader impact of higher energy prices and contagion via further dislocations to global supply chains that is far more significant but also harder to quantify.

China’s response is also critical in setting the geopolitical tone for years to come. A new cold war fought along economic lines with China and Russia in the same camp would be highly damaging at a time when the need for international cooperation in the energy transition is imperative. At the very least, it appears as if the trend away from globalization in trade relations will accelerate.

The rising importance of a thematic perspective on both risks and opportunities will need to be explicitly incorporated into investment processes. Moreover, with greater uncertainty, there will be an increase in overreaction to changing events. With the appropriate discipline and risk management, there are still plenty of good opportunities to invest in good companies at great prices.

#3 - The key transmission mechanism is commodity prices, which could remain higher for longer

Rising cost pressures are the main concern in the short run, particularly for those companies that have less pricing power (e.g., staples). 

A good proxy for this is both the level and stability of profit margins, which are explicitly incorporated within the QEP Quality Framework. 

We believe companies that are showing evidence of withstanding margin pressure and have healthy, although not necessarily the highest, forward growth expectations without excessive financial leverage are best equipped against this backdrop (e.g., pharmaceuticals).

Aside from the direct short-term impact on input costs, higher commodity prices complicate the longer term prospects of a successful global energy transition with significant implications for positioning within the energy sector today. The paths to net zero are broad and unlikely to be coordinated with significant implications for value chains and capital spending.

The investment required for the necessary transition is immense. The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Net Zero 2050 scenario suggests that energy capital investment will need to rise from 2.5% of GDP today to 4.5% by 2030. This will divert investment from existing “dirtier” projects at a time when such materials are crucial to building a cleaner economy.

The risk here is “greenflation,” where we observe much higher demand and prices for copper, lithium, aluminum and other minerals. Paradoxically, the extraction of these metals and minerals, which all have a high carbon footprint, must be balanced against the longer term benefits. 

Once again, there will be winners and losers, but we are assuming that most commodity prices will remain elevated for a sustained period. For oil specifically, a potential deal with Iran and the US releasing strategic reserves will only go some way to mitigate the gap between supply and demand.

Ironically, sustainability-focused investors have sharply underperformed their less environmentally aware peers of late because of this upward adjustment in commodity prices but capital markets have a critical role to play in financing this transition while mitigating the risk to long-established business models. 

A simple approach of divesting from all fossil fuels may be risky but in our view, there need not be a compromise. Investors should focus on identifying the best-in-class companies that are either leaders or enablers in the energy transition.

#4 - The tailwinds behind big tech have abated

One uncertainty is whether, in a world where profitability will be harder to source, the market instinctively defaults back to growth for security. So far this has not occurred and if anything, the market appears to be quite discriminating in terms of distinguishing between those with more sustainable earnings and the longer tail of more speculative narratives.

Despite a strong run during the pandemic, a good example would be “profitless” tech, which has underperformed sharply in the past year alongside other high-profile causalities of excessive optimism (e.g., Netflix). With a few notable exceptions, pursuing such stocks has not historically generated a sustainable source of returns and more broadly, it has not paid to continually rely upon exuberant market behavior.

Greater discrimination is healthy and a far cry from the narrowness of performance between 2017 and late 2020. While its impact may be overstated, one mechanism that may be holding back growth is that higher long-term yields make profits in the future less attractive.

Our working assumption is that big tech has reached an equilibrium in terms of its weight in the mainstream indices and its broader influence within society; further gains or losses from here will be more stock specific in nature. In other words, jam today will be prized more than jam tomorrow.

Market overreaction has, however, generated many opportunities within “quality growth” areas, which, in our view, have also been left behind in recent years and, rather unusually by historical standards, can be a sizeable allocation within a value-focused portfolio.

#5 - The case for “value” remains compelling but…

...the long-awaited revival in value investing that commenced in November 2020 may appear to have swiftly run out of steam during 2021. 

Such a short recovery would be highly unusual but, more importantly, there remains a significant disconnect between the relative performance of cheaper stocks and their fundamentals, at least when measured by forward earnings growth. Using MSCI’s style indices as a proxy, this is most apparent in the US market where the 50%+ underperformance of the Value Index since 2017 has not been justified by the progression of expected earnings.

Figure 2 - MSCI US Indices – Value vs. Growth

Figure 3 - MSCI ACWI ex US Indices – Value vs. Growth

Source: Refinitiv, period from January 2017 to March 2022. Performance of MSCI indices are shown Total Return (RI). Forward Earnings information from MSCI. Past performance provides no guarantee of future results.

Source: Refinitiv, period from January 2017 to March 2022. Performance of MSCI indices are shown Total Return (RI). Forward Earnings information from MSCI. Past performance provides no guarantee of future results.

#6 - Why you should avoid value traps

The case is even stronger when we further distinguish within the value universe among those stocks with stronger fundamentals. Indeed, a comparison of value, quality and the intersection of value and quality (i.e., affordable stocks with good fundamentals) suggests the best returns will be found in “quality-value,” in line with long-run performance.

The current valuation discount associated with this cohort of quality and value stocks implies a three-year outperformance of 12% for them to return to their long-run discount to the market, after considering expected growth. A good example of attractively priced quality is pharmaceuticals, which is currently trading on the widest discount to the broader market since at least 1995.

The key to value investing over the long run, but particularly during times of economic or market stress, is avoiding value traps.

Figure 4 - Value vs. MSCI World Discount

Figure 5 - Expected Return over the next 3 years

Source: QEP, IBES. LHS: Since December 1987 to March 2022. The ‘value’ basket is formed from a cap weighted basket of the cheapest global stocks based on a MSCI World universe (based on forward earnings, book to price and sales to EV). The ‘growth’ basket is formed from a cap weighted bucket of the fastest growing stocks based on an MSCI World universe (forward growth). Valuations are measured as cap-weighted median on each basket. RHS: Expected return assumes normalization of Forward Price/Earnings over the next three years. The Forward Price/Earnings numbers are based on QEP calculated portfolios and the growth in EPS numbers are based on the created QEP portfolios, where the medians are taken. The views shared may not lead to favorable investment opportunities. Expected  returns are not guaranteed. Actual performance results may vary.

Source: QEP, IBES. LHS: Since December 1987 to March 2022. The ‘value’ basket is formed from a cap weighted basket of the cheapest global stocks based on a MSCI World universe (based on forward earnings, book to price and sales to EV). The ‘growth’ basket is formed from a cap weighted bucket of the fastest growing stocks based on an MSCI World universe (forward growth). Valuations are measured as cap-weighted median on each basket. RHS: Expected return assumes normalization of Forward Price/Earnings over the next three years. The Forward Price/Earnings numbers are based on QEP calculated portfolios and the growth in EPS numbers are based on the created QEP portfolios, where the medians are taken. The views shared may not lead to favorable investment opportunities. Expected  returns are not guaranteed. Actual performance results may vary.

Financials are a good case in point. Banks are noteworthy as a traditional value area of the market and are highly represented in value-focused portfolios and the corresponding style indices. However, they are also handicapped by a squeeze on their net interest margins from a flat yield curve and the prospect of slower credit growth. While the sector has come a long way from the excesses of the pre-GFC era, once again it pays to be selective and focus on asset quality.

Figure 6 - Percentage of ‘Cheap’ companies that have underperformed the benchmark by more than 20% in a 3M rolling period

Figure 7 - % of ‘Expensive’ companies that have underperformed the benchmark by more than 20% in a 3M rolling period

Source: Refinitiv, QEP. MSCI World companies, ‘Value’ defined as having a QEP Value Rank of below 50%, ‘Expensive’ is above 50% (lower = better). ‘Low Quality’ companies have a QEP Global Quality Ranks of above 50% and ‘High Quality’ have a rank below 50%. Chart shows a 10 business day moving average.  Historical performance trends should not be relied upon to evaluate current result

Source: Refinitiv, QEP. MSCI World companies, ‘Value’ defined as having a QEP Value Rank of below 50%, ‘Expensive’ is above 50% (lower = better). ‘Low Quality’ companies have a QEP Global Quality Ranks of above 50% and ‘High Quality’ have a rank below 50%. Chart shows a 10 business day moving average.  Historical performance trends should not be relied upon to evaluate current result

#7 - Emerging markets are cheap for a reason and should be assessed bottom-up

A similar argument for being selective can be made for emerging markets, which are often lumped together and thereby exposed to high level asset allocation calls rather than a more nuanced assessment.

The emerging market universe is in fact highly diverse with a variety of drivers. The simple split between commodity exporters and net importers of resources has been very apparent in the past year with Latin America, the Middle East and South Africa riding the tailwinds, in some cases propelled further by currency appreciation (e.g., Brazilian real and South African rand). On a related point, Taiwan and South Korea are more vulnerable, given that they are more geared into global growth due to their high export content.

Meanwhile, China has fallen from favor due to its regulatory crackdown on several key sectors, not least the forceful clampdown on its tech giants during 2021 in favor of common prosperity. 

This was further compounded by the uncertainty about the extent of China’s support of Russia and the ongoing risk of US regulators delisting Chinese companies due to insufficient audit documents that back their financial statements. 

In response, Beijing has recently offered an olive branch by signaling its broader support of the market, which investors took to mean an end to the regulatory intervention for now, and cooperating more closely with the SEC on US-listed Chinese stocks. 

Alongside this, China is struggling with a faltering property market and its zero COVID-19 policy will severely hit growth this year as rising infections led to citywide lockdowns, although it will most likely be countered for additional credit stimulus.

More broadly, unlike previous crises in emerging markets, the threat of contagion from a Russian default appears limited as short-term external debt (as a % of FX reserves) is lower than has historically been the case and exchange rates are also more appropriately valued. In summary, opportunities in emerging markets should be considered bottom-up while fully recognizing the broader top-down risks, which are more elevated than at any time since the Taper Tantrum of 2013.

Summary

Geopolitical crises have historically provided a buying opportunity for equity-focused investors. However, it is less widely stated that the main caveat to the resulting “buy the dip” response is whether the crisis then goes on to precipitate a recession. This is still not currently a consensus view, but the odds have certainly declined. Moreover, the fact that Russia seems likely to remain isolated from the rest of the world for the foreseeable future does increase the risk of unprecedented retaliatory measures.

Clearly, the situation remains very uncertain and a high degree of caution is warranted. This need not derail the broader attractiveness of seeking out good value opportunities as the excesses of the 2017-2020 period have only partially unwound, although avoiding value traps will be even more important. The unusually high representation of defensive stocks trading on relatively cheap valuations means that investors do not need to head for the hills in search of safety.

Equities are currently far more sanguine than the bond market, which seems unlikely to persist. At the very least, the elevated level of uncertainty about the geopolitical and macroeconomic environment suggests that equities will be more volatile and prone to larger swings in sentiment. The view that the Fed is now playing catch-up feeds into this uncertainty.

As a final comment, we note that periods of moderate market volatility have historically provided a favorable backdrop to our diversified approach, as it tends to generate short-term opportunities. Being able to harvest excess market volatility by trading efficiently (little and often) may well be a bigger driver of relative performance this year than making less predictable top-down calls.



Schroders Australia

Established in 1961, Schroders in Australia is a wholly owned subsidiary of UK-listed Schroders plc. Based in Sydney, the business manages assets for institutional and wholesale clients across Australian equities, fixed income and multi-asset and...

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